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Abstract 
Purpose – The liberalization of European telecommunications has been expressed 
in highly concentrated markets with several major players at the pan-European 
level. Instead of fostering competitive marketplaces, the reform has created an 
oligopolistic landscape with powerful private corporations. This induces 
reasonable questions about the real objectives and the chosen ways of the reform. 
Methodology/approach/design – The deregulatory movement in the 
telecommunications sector is analyzed through contrasting perspectives of the 
public interest approach and public choice theory. 
Findings – The chance to change the landscape of the industry has been missed, 
and the current trend towards the global oligopolistic marketplace yields an 
unprecedented amount of economic power to narrow groups at the global scale. 
The liberalization movement introduced market mechanisms in the industry, but 
the real free and open market has never been formed, and it is possible to assert 
that it has never been among the real objectives and intentions of the 
policymakers. 
Originality/value – The recent surge of “liberalization” in the 
telecommunications industry speaks rather in favor of the hypothesis of vested 
private interests in the policy and that they have always been greatly covered by 
the sauce of public interest justifications. The case of telecommunications shows 
that ideas and understanding of economic phenomena played an important role in 
adoption of regulatory regimes, and it is apparent that people on the top of the 
social pyramid have opportunities to pick up and foster those ideas that better fit 
their private needs.  
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1. Introduction 
The nature of state interventions into economy might have different 
explanations, and two opposite extremes are public and private interests 
(Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Laffont and Tirole 1991). When the interventions 
are justified by the public interest, the classical arguments stem from the market 
failure explanation, and sometimes take a form of appeals for social justice, 
humanism, safety and security and other concerns that are not directly connected 
to the efficiency problem, but that are supported by theories and concepts from 
political philosophy and social sciences (see, e.g. Stiglitz 1988). Public choice 
theory, developed in the 1960s, has promoted the opposite view at public policy 
and underlined that the main driving force of political decision-making processes 
is private interests of individuals (Peltzman 1989; Buchanan and Tullock 1962; 
Tullock, Seldon and Brady 2002).  
Since the time of appearance of this public and private interest separation 
in the economics mainstream, many scholars have tried to analyze various 
economic problems from these contrasting perspectives (e.g., Laffont and Tirole 
1991; Djankov et al. 2001). The present paper is an attempt to contribute to this 
scholarship and to apply these opposite views to the deregulatory movement in 
the telecommunications sector with a particular focus at the European experience. 
The results of the liberalization reform in the industry are highly concentrated 
markets with several major players at the pan-European level, and this induces 
reasonable questions about which kind of interests, public or private, have 
prevailed in the chosen way of liberalization. 
The article begins with a brief review of public and private interest theories 
of regulation. After that, it examines the applicability of these theories to the 
liberalization reform of the telecommunications industry. The main 
argumentation of the paper is concentrated around the position that although the 
objectives of the reform indeed represented the public interest view, there are 
several questions that are better described by the public choice approach. The 
paper examines alternatives that could be adopted by the regulators, arguing that 
these alternatives also fit the concept of public interest, and analyzes why this 
choice has not been made. 
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2. Theoretical framework: The public interest concept and the public 
choice view 
The idea of the public interest has been perfectly presented by Abraham 
Lincoln’s vision of “government of the people, by the people, for the people” and 
since the seminal work of Arthur Cecil Pigou, “Economics of Welfare”, has been 
embraced by the mainstream of economics as a response to the issue of market 
failures. The understanding that the market does not provide perfect solutions for 
a number of economic problems and that such imperfectness requires corrective 
interventions in the market performance has allowed to consider the government 
as a benevolent maximizer of social welfare (Laffont and Tirole 1991).  
In addition to the market failure as a reason to intervene, there are also 
public interest theories that take into account non-“welfare maximization” 
objectives, such as public interest redistribution of resources to the poor or the 
disadvantaged, reduction of social subordination, obligations owed to future 
generations, protection of animals and wild nature, etc. (see, e.g., Sunstein 1993). 
Regardless of a theory that uses the public interest claim, and even in those cases 
when the concept is assumed as something granted for the analysis, it is crucial to 
keep in mind that the idea of the public interest is one of the most questionable, 
fragile and vague concepts that overwhelm economic theory (Buchanan and 
Tullock 1962). There are no tools that would allow to measure this phenomenon 
or that would provide robust explanation what the public interest stands for. There 
is no agreement, and, possibly, there cannot be agreement, about what is good and 
what is bad for our society, and, even if this desirability could be established, what 
are the best methods to achieve the desired outcomes (see, e.g., Hayek 1976). The 
concept has been vigorously criticized by many prominent pundits, economists 
and philosophers, because many of them have seen the public interest as simply 
“a rhetorical device that people use to persuade other people that they should agree 
to some policy they themselves favor.” 1  
Despite of this criticism, the public interest concept is a necessary tool for 
justification of political decisions and government actions, and cannot be avoided 
by society. Even the assertion of scholars, such as Hayek, that social justice is a 
meaningless term, that the role of the state is not to provide remedies for market 
failures and not to establish any goals for social and economic activity such as 
welfare maximization or efficiency, but to establish rules of just conduct and to 
allow “spontaneous order” to put everything on the proper places (Hayek 1976), 
                                                          
1 See, e.g., an analysis of views of Karl Popper and Friedrich Hayek on the public 
interest in Notturno (2015). 
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in order to be accepted requires vigorous justification that might be provided only 
through the position of the public interest.  
In any case, the public interest assumes a choice between different 
alternatives, and even if we suppose that in some ideal situations the policymaking 
process is not affected by rent-seeking behavior, lobbyism, bribery or other forms 
of corruption, i.e. the process might be analyzed through the lens of public interest 
theory, the policymakers still cannot be free from their own beliefs, 
epistemological limitations and their own understanding of which alternative is 
better suited for social needs. As a result, the public interest might be considered 
as an outcome of a system based on the spontaneous order idea, i.e. a system that 
does not envisage achievement of any aims at all and, thus, does not incorporate 
not only private interests, but that is also not affected by any subjective views and 
biases.  
The ambiguity and vagueness of the public interest perception is not the 
only weakness of the concept. The explanatory power of the concept is mainly 
focused around reasons and objectives of regulation, while the chosen ways of the 
achievement of the goals very often remain without convincing answers. The 
concept is unable to explain why the particular aims or methods of their 
achievement have been adopted when alternatives could also be sufficiently 
supported by the public interest argumentation, and this gap has been filled up by 
public choice theory. 
The alternative to the public interest view on regulation is an understanding 
that in the real world, in contrast to the idealistic models, all economic actors have 
their own personal interests and make their decisions with these private objectives 
in mind. Public choice theory, being one of those endeavors in modern economics 
promoting an alternative to the public interest view on the political decision 
making process, claims that the government rather than to be “of, by and for the 
people”, is merely an instrument in the hands of some people (Tullock, Seldon 
and Brady 2002). Buchanan and Tullock (1962), who are among the founders of 
public choice theory, comparing the pursuit of the public interest with searching 
for the holy grail, reject the usage of the concept apart from “the separate interests 
of the individual participants” as meaningful and suggest that the public interest 
is never defined. 
Croley (1998), describing the public choice theory of regulation, points out 
that this approach analogizes regulatory decision making to market decision 
making in a particular market where actors exchange “regulatory goods”, such as 
subsidies, entry barriers, price regulation, etc. The demand side of this market is 
fueled by private economic interests of citizens and entrepreneurs, while on the 
supply side private economic interests of politicians are augmented by their 
private political interests. Taking into account that organized groups and powerful 
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business entities have significantly higher lobbying opportunities and incentives 
to influence regulation than individual voters, public choice emphasizes that “the 
regulatory market works … to the advantage of organized groups with narrow 
interests,” rather than to society as a whole (Croley 1998, p. 39). 
Generally speaking, public choice is not an alternative to the public interest 
concept, especially if we take the point of view such as of Richard Posner that the 
public interest doctrine is not an economic theory at all. 2  The public choice 
approach does not exclude the idea that the government might act in the interests 
of society, but underlines that the government consists of individuals that have 
their own personal interests. These personal interests of politicians and 
bureaucrats for some reasons and in some circumstances, may coincide with 
common public needs, and even when they are different, democracy provides 
some tools to affect the decision-making process. However, being no more 
efficient than free market mechanisms, democracy does not provide sufficient 
protection from incorporation of private interests in regulation and is even often 
used for their achievement. 
As well as the public interest approach, public choice is not without 
drawbacks. Being one of the economic theories, public choice mainly perceives 
private interests in economic terms and faces difficulties in analyzing cases when 
actors have altruistic, unselfish or public-spirited behavior. However, the major 
problem of private interest theories is that we hardly know anything about real 
interests of analyzed actors, about their psychological features and moral 
principles and, what is possibly even more important, about their actual 
relationships with other actors of the markets of “regulatory goods”. The result of 
it is that even when we have all reasons to argue that some particular decision has 
been affected by certain private interests, it still might be a case where the 
policymakers had other objectives in their minds or that this is a case of other 
private interests interactions than we assume in the analysis. Researchers that look 
at regulation from private interest positions might easily face counterarguments 
that they attribute hidden motivations to policymakers without sufficient 
evidence. At the same time, those who take the public interestedness as the 
foundation of political decisions for granted do not need to provide any support 
for their starting point.  
In contrast to the public interest view, the power of public choice to serve 
as a guide in public policy is severely limited, and mainly might be expressed in 
appeals to deregulation due to the general pessimistic views of private interest 
theories about possibilities to promote collective welfare through interventions 
into market mechanisms. However, it should be noticed again that adoption of 
                                                          
2 Posner (1980, p. 503) notices that “public-interest theory is a description, rather 
than an economic theory.” 
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such policy as well as a choice of the ways of deregulation cannot be done without 
public interest argumentation, which inevitably leads to incorporation of private 
interests in the deregulatory move and that requires the tools of public choice in 
order to find out why the particular choice has been made. 
Since telecommunications have always been a “laboratory” for regulatory 
experiments (Levi-Faur 1998), it becomes very interesting to look at the collision 
of public and private interest theories of regulation in their attempts to explain the 
biggest experiment that occurred in the telecommunications sector during the last 
decades of the 20s century and that still continue to affect the performance of the 
industry. 
 
3. Public interest explanation of liberalization of the 
telecommunications sector 
It might be argued that the public interest approach gives a strong 
explanatory basis for liberalization of the telecommunications industry, especially 
if we look at the results. Modern telecommunications provide us a big variety of 
different services, many of which could even not have been imagined and could 
not be placed into policy documents 20-30 years ago. The introduction of market 
mechanisms, the appearance of private initiatives and technological progress have 
changed our world, making the industry one of the main drivers for economic 
development. Any arguments that preservation of the state-owned monopolies 
and state governance of the technological development could better fit the 
growing needs of our society would hardly be positively met by the contemporary 
scientific community.  
Despite the vagueness and indefiniteness of the public interest concept, the 
liberalization and deregulation of the telecommunications markets is one of those 
cases where even critics of the approach might agree that it was a movement 
towards social needs. Some even argued that “social developments seemed to 
refute” the theories that look at regulation from the positions of private interests 
(Den Hertog 2010, p. 36). However, it seems that the public interest view does 
not provide a comprehensive explanation for at least for two aspects of the reform. 
The first is the timing, or more precisely why the process had not been initiated 
earlier, and the particular peculiarity of the issue is that the reform was enacted in 
a large number of world countries around the same period. The second is the way 
of the reform, or why the outcome of the reform was programmed as a set of 
oligopolistic markets that sometimes are represented in transnational oligopolistic 
form. Moreover, it is reasonable to find whether there were alternative ways for 
the reformation of the industry. 
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Many researchers connect the beginning of the reform with technological 
change that forced states to open their telecommunications markets (see, e.g., 
Stiglitz 1999; Laffont and Tirole 2000), and from this point of view policymakers 
had no choice, but to deregulate. Public interest theory explains it in the way that 
new technological solutions allowed to remove market failures that warranted the 
interventions in the preceding periods or that deregulation in the new 
technological environment is the more efficient solution for the market failure 
problem than regulation (Den Hertog 2010).  
The first question that arises from this explanation is what was the market 
failure that supported the monopolistic nature of the industry? Despite the fact 
that the idea about natural monopoly characteristics of telephone services has been 
incorporated in the mainstream understanding of economics of 
telecommunications (see, e.g., Posner 1968; Joskow 2007), many empirical 
studies questioned this paradigm (see e.g. Evans and Heckman, 1983; Shin and 
Ying, 1992; see also the discussion in Spulber and Yoo, 2013). There was a large 
number of explicit claims about the artificial nature of such monopolies and the 
role of the government in their formation (e.g. DiLorenzo 1996; Thierer 1994; 
Trubnikov 2017b), and the example of the US industry in the early stages of its 
development shows that the industry could have a competitive form (Mueller 
2013; Janson and Yoo 2013).  
Moreover, the first years of liberalization in many instances were not the 
years that brought to the markets new services or advanced technologies. Of 
course, some subscribers benefited from new technological solutions in long-
distance or mobile services, but for many the beginning of the liberalization just 
yielded ordinary phones in their homes. 3  While the state explained state control 
of the industry by the necessity of provision of socially valuable services for all 
members of society, these services, for a long time were rather luxury goods for 
a significant part of the households in many places of the world. The market had 
solved this public interest issue more efficiently and faster than the state during 
the previous years of inefficient state governance (see, e.g., Stiglitz 1999). 
Therefore, there are sound reasons to question the public interestedness of the 
government control of the industry before the liberalization period. 
                                                          
3 E.g., Armstrong & Sappington (2006), analyzing the development of the 
industry in Chile, show that “liberalization” allowed to increase the number of 
fixed lines more than three times between 1992 and 2000. Stiglitz (1999) notices 
that in many countries the reforms had expressed in “increases in the scope of 
telephone coverage and reduction of prices” (Stiglitz 1999, p. 5) and that “in many 
developing countries, entrepreneurs have … demonstrated their ability to bring 
telephone services to poor villages” (Stiglitz 1999, p. 13). 
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The second question is what could be an effect of liberalization on 
technological development of the industry if the market mechanisms were 
introduced earlier, and we can assume that in this case we could face more rapid 
technological progress. As an example, digital switches and fiber optic, as well 
as, cellular telephony are the technologies that started spreading in the 
monopolistic industry in the 1970s-1980s and resulted in the growing number of 
networks subscribers, but they were not the technologies that were developed in 
the 1970s-1980s. Tim Wu (2010), for instance, argues that by 1916 AT&T already 
had “a working prototype” of a “wireless telephone”, but since the technology 
was in the hands of the monopoly of the “wired” industry, it could not have 
chances to be driven by market forces. 
The 1990s and 2000s were the periods where the market demonstrated how 
fast it is able to adopt and facilitate diffusion of technological advancements, 
reducing the costs of technological solutions and bringing the services into new 
areas, and, therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that the market could do it much 
earlier if the government did not suppress the market mechanisms in the industry. 
Of course, it might be argued that the level of semiconductor industry of that time 
imposed some limitations and that, for example, the weight of the first cellular 
phones made them inconvenient for subscribers or that the production cost did not 
allow widespread diffusion of the technology, but, at the same time, we have to 
admit that the state preservation of the monopoly until the last decades of the 20s 
century by no means played in favor of the industry development, cost reduction, 
and it is not clear whether it played for the public welfare. 4       
The public interest paradigm in the chosen way of the liberalization also 
induces a number of questions. Why had the industry not been torn apart in a 
number of independent enterprises, vertically and horizontally, 5  which could 
have helped eliminating the problem of market power and, thus, the necessity to 
create artificial competition? Why did the chosen way of the reform so vigorously 
require the slowness and prohibitiveness during the first phases of the process? 
Why might deregulation in many places of the world, in fact, be better described 
as re-regulation? 
Answers of the public interest approach to the questions above might be 
based on prevailing views in economics of telecommunications, which payed 
significant attention to the natural monopoly characteristics of crucial parts of the 
                                                          
4 According to some estimates, the delay in introduction of mobile services in the 
US decreased consumers' welfare on dozens of billions of dollars (Hausman 
1997). 
5 It is necessary to acknowledge that the pattern was not totally the same 
everywhere, but, nevertheless, the results of the liberalization are regulatory 
formed oligopolistic markets. 
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industry and high level of sunk costs of telecommunications networks. There were 
also concerns that liberalization could result in rates, as well as costs increases, 
reduction of service quality and R&D expenditures, problems with technical 
compatibilities and so forth. However, it is important to note that there was a lack 
of unanimity among the telecommunications policy scholars. Eli Noam (1993), 
for example, distinguished four main positions based on different combinations 
of antitrust and deregulation dimensions: anti-monopoly/deregulatory, anti-
monopoly/pro-regulatory, pro-monopoly/deregulatory, pro-monopoly/pro-
regulatory.  
Some of the scholars from the anti-monopoly camp advocated the idea that 
“competition is needed to be established by intervention” and appealed to the 
divestiture of incumbents (see, e.g., Noam 1993; Burton 1997; Stiglitz 1999), but, 
nevertheless, even these anti-monopoly appeals have been severely limited by the 
mainstream theories. As a result, nowhere in the world a telecommunications 
marketplace dominated by small independent enterprises was formed by the “anti-
monopoly” movement. There were examples of the USA, Japan, Russia, where 
the break-up of the former monopolies vividly played in interests of the public, 
but the policymakers did not envisage that the basic unit for the newly formed 
landscape could be a network within the coverage of a telephone exchange or a 
network of a scale of a city. 
Despite the appearance of new technologies and advancements in 
economic studies, the natural monopoly belief did not vanish from the general 
understanding of the economy of telecommunications in the 1970s - 1980s. 
Nevertheless, the idea that not all parts of the industry share these natural 
monopoly characteristics eventually appeared in the mainstream. However, this 
did not challenge the monopolistic status of the local phone networks that was the 
core part of the industry providing customers access to not only local services, but 
also to intercity and international connections, and that eventually became a 
fundament for the construction of the broadband networks. 
Many scholars and authorities in the 1980s claimed that “local telephone 
services seem to be generally accepted as a natural monopoly” (Breyer 1982, p. 
291) and that without the natural monopoly argument “restriction of entry into the 
local telecommunications loop is not justified” (Spulber 1995, p. 34). Indeed, this 
justification could be the only plausible explanation of public interestedness in the 
preservation of monopolies in local parts of the telephone industry during the 
initial phases of the reform and slowness of the liberalization process. 
The natural monopoly paradigm of the 20th century has not escaped from 
the policy even in the new era and continued to play an essential role as an idea 
of bottlenecks. Laffont and Tirole explicitly link the concepts of natural monopoly 
and bottlenecks in their highly-cited book “Competition in telecommunication” 
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(2000) when they argue that some segments of the industry are natural monopolies 
and that “these segments become bottlenecks”. They also point out that the 
location of the bottlenecks depends on the technology and that it changes with the 
industry’s evolution. Such a statement, as well as the attention that has been paid 
in the telecommunications policy to the problem of bottlenecks are vivid evidence 
that the natural monopoly paradigm, in fact, has never escaped the mainstream 
view on the industry, even despite the concept nowadays has been severely 
reduced to some particular segments of the field. 
Meanwhile, from the history of competition in the early days in the US it 
is clear that the average cost curve did not have a downward slope (Mueller 2013), 
i.e. the industry was not an example of a natural monopoly according to the 
classical definition of the term. There might be a hypothesis that later 
technological development changed this feature, but this is not more than a 
hypothesis that has been questioned by many scholars (see e.g. Evans and 
Heckman 1983; Shin and Ying 1992), and even in the mainstream theory we could 
find statements such as “as more subscribers are connected to a telephone 
network, the average cost per subscriber may rise” (Joskow 2007, p. 1239). In 
other words, there is no robust evidence that theoretical models based on the 
natural monopoly concept have ever reflected reality, while they have always 
perfectly supported industry policy and continue to provide this support. 
The understanding of telecommunications as an example of natural 
monopoly in one form or another ruled the reforms of the last decades in the 
majority of the world countries. The European “deregulation”, 
“demonopolization” and “privatization” reform of the telecommunications sector 
started in 1987 with the introduction of the "Green Paper on the Development of 
the Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment" by 
Commission of the European Communities. The reform that put 
telecommunications services in the “market environment” took more than 10 
years and did not allow competition in different fields of the industry at once (see, 
e.g., Larouche 2000). 
Of course, if a company has invested in the infrastructure construction, a 
bigger number of connected users through this infrastructure will reduce the 
average cost. However, this, firstly, does not mean that if the industry consists of 
a number of companies operating in different districts, cities or regions, then this 
industry has higher average costs than it could have if the only one operator 
provides the services in the entire territory; and, secondly, it even does not mean 
that service providers operating in nearby areas and even in the same areas will 
not be able to benefit from economies of scale of their own networks, do their 
business more efficiently than a monopolist, and, at the same time, provide their 
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users the possibility to benefit from the total network effect through 
interconnections of their networks. 
It might be argued that in such a case we face local monopolies, but if their 
operating area is sufficiently small, that means that overlapping of the areas is 
feasible and that the local monopolies are under pressure of potential entrance of 
the nearby competitors. It is very important to note that one of the mainstream 
theories — the theory of contestable markets — looks at the issues from the 
similar viewpoint. According to this theory, even those markets that have a 
monopolistic or oligopolistic structure might provide the same outcome as 
“perfectly competitive markets” if they are perfectly contestable (Baumol, Panzar 
and Willig 1982). Spulber and Yoo (2013, p. 5), for example, even argue that 
“[t]echnological change … has made telecommunications markets contestable by 
reducing the sunk costs associated with market entry.” The deregulation 
movement had a chance to promote this kind of contestability in the industry. 
Deviation of such a monopoly from the optimal performance or opportunities for 
monopolistic competition due to technological pluralism makes overlapping 
inevitable if the network structure is represented by a number of independent 
networks, and, thus, these local monopolies could be easily destroyed by the real 
market process. 
Moreover, the European reform could adopt the ordoliberal views at the 
competitive order, especially if to take into account the prevailing “mythology” 
about the ordoliberal nature of EU competition policy (Akman and Kassim 2010), 
but by that time the ordoliberal principles had been already replaced by the 
neoliberal outlook of the Chicago school of economics and “efficiency-enhancing 
rationale” (Bartalevich, 2016). While the ordoliberal school appealed for 
“creating an economy where production is decentralised and takes place in 
relatively small units” (Schnyder and Siems 2013), the mainstream ideology did 
not envisage such a competitive order for the telecommunications sector 
(Trubnikov and Trubnikova 2018). 
 
4. The view on liberalization through the lens of private interests 
The economic theory of regulation describes deregulation from positions 
of private interests (see, e.g., Peltzman 1989). It is possible to distinguish different 
explanations of why captured regulation makes a choice of deregulation, 
especially taking into account that deregulation usually takes a form of a new 
regulatory environment, and among them the changing balance of political power 
of pressure groups or a decision of influential groups that they can better achieve 
their interests in an alternative regulatory regime (Peltzman 1989). 
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However, it possibly would be an exaggeration to claim that all regulatory 
bodies everywhere in the world were taken by the main interest groups and acted 
explicitly in order to put their private interests in the policy agenda. We also 
cannot neglect the role of international institutions and other forces that affected 
the liberalization movement in telecommunications. In such reasoning, Brady, for 
example, emphasizes the role of supranational institutions in the process such as 
the European Union, the World Trade Organization and the International 
Telecommunication Union, as well as positive experience of other countries (in 
Tullock, Seldon, and Brady 2002). Schneider (2001, p. 76), on the other side, 
analyzing the deregulation in Germany, France and Italy, points out the role of 
OECD and GATT, that have been used as “bargaining arenas” for the “US 
strategy … to open international markets in this sector.” Levi-Faur (2005, p. 25), 
describing the rise of regulatory capitalism starting in the 1980s, points out the 
version that “international institutions, acting at least partially as agents of the 
United States,” have been the main sources of liberalization reforms in other 
world countries. Joseph Stiglitz (1998, p. 19), analyzing “the private uses of 
public interests,” notices that “international issues are probably more subject to 
capture.” In other words, it has become common in the academic society to 
suspect that international institutions serve the particular private interests of the 
most influential global groups, even if their positions have been supported by the 
claims about the national interests, and their role in the reforms of 
telecommunications policy is not an exception from this pattern. 
Milton Mueller (2010) in his well-known book “Networks and States: The 
Global Politics of Internet Governance” points out that the world-wide 
liberalization of telecommunications was pushed by the US in the interests of the 
US economy. The traces of the US interests in the international arena have been 
augmented by business interests of leading players of the European advanced 
economies. Schneider (2001), for example, points out that European 
Commission’s allies and supporters in the mid-1980s were large European 
industrial firms such as Alcatel, Olivetti, Philips, and Siemens, and this statement 
in combination with the activity of AT&T in the European market at that time 
might explain why the first step in the liberalization was the opening of the market 
of telecommunications equipment (Trubnikov 2017b). There are also claims that 
for major European telecommunications enterprises, the opening of the 
international telecommunications sphere signified opportunities to expand their 
business empires and that these benefits outweighed the losses from the necessity 
of reciprocal duties to allow competitors to enter their local marketplaces (see, 
e.g., Clifton, Díaz-Fuentes, and Revuelta 2010). 
Such views provide some alternatives to the public interest explanation of 
the liberalization of telecommunications at the end of the 20th century and give 
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answers to the questions about the timing and chosen methods. When we are 
looking at the field from the position of public choice theory, we have to bear in 
mind that the units of analysis are not companies or organizations, but individuals. 
The individuals might cooperate and form different groups with those who have 
similar interests or might be useful for a while, but, nevertheless, these private 
interests are the interests of particular persons. Moreover, these interests are not 
always expressed in financial terms, and often take a form of behavior that by no 
means can be considered as wrongdoing. If politicians even with a “good spirit” 
were keen to adopt particular methods of deregulation of the industry, they had to 
make a choice, and this choice had been affected by other people, who not 
necessarily were so public-spirited, and by experience of other territories, that had 
not necessarily been formed by uncorrupted policymakers. An alternative way to 
the reform could bring unforeseen results and it imposed risks on the decision-
making process. 
Liberalization went hand in hand with privatization, and it opened 
opportunities for some individuals to become owners of valuable assets, and 
sometimes the price paid for this newly formed property was lower than the real 
price or could be considered in this way. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) in this 
sense point out the remarkable case of Mexican telecommunications industry, but 
even European countries where governments are often considered as more public-
spirited, have also faced the situation when “today it is clear that the price could 
have been higher” (Florio 2007, p. 3). However, we can only guess why the price 
was in fact lower than it could have been, and private and public interest theories 
of regulation provide us totally different explanations. For those people who 
benefited from privatization, the alternative ways of telecommunications reform 
would not bring such benefits, but again they were not the only stakeholders of 
the industry. There were officials, bureaucrats and managers that governed the 
industry during the days of state-owned monopolies, and while the alternative 
would signify an immediate solution for separation of operational and regulatory 
functions,6 for these stakeholders it could mean uncertainty of their future 
positions and personal incomes. 
Another important issue of the “liberalization — privatization” reform is 
an attempt of governments to raise the revenues that they could receive from 
privatization, and here there is a clear contradiction between the goals of creation 
of a competitive market and maximization of the governments’ incomes. Business 
endeavors that promise monopoly profits cost higher than enterprises whose 
future positions are highly uncertain due to a competitive environment of the 
marketplace. From this point of view, preservation of significant market power of 
                                                          
6 It was clear that this separation was essential for the success of the reform (see, 
e.g., Melody 1999). 
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an incumbent allows to get higher revenue from its sale than if the company had 
been split up into a number of independent enterprises competing between each 
other. In many jurisdictions, privatization in the industry even assumed an 
“exclusivity period” for the incumbents, that, definitely, in the same way as the 
widely implemented delay in the placement of all services in the competitive 
environment, could not play in favor of competition (see, e.g., Wallsten 2004). As 
a result, privatization of telecommunications assets “in many countries failed to 
foster competitive markets, instead creating large private monopolies” (Wallsten 
2002, p. 4). 
Even the positive experience of the US divestiture of the former monopoly 
into 7 independent companies and the separation of local and long-distance 
business, was not considered as a guidance for others. On the contrary, there are 
totally opposing examples. For instance, the former Italian monopoly, that before 
the liberalization was represented by several companies, merged this assets in 
Telecom Italia in 1994 (see, e.g., GSMA 2013).7 Some scholars, noticing that the 
“[a]greement between the political system and private interests in the field of 
telecommunications has been an integral part of Italian economic history,” openly 
name the Italian telecom privatization as an example of “privatization failure” 
(Florio 2007, p. 2). Another possibility for competition were cellular services that 
de facto represent a substitute for fixed telephony, but in a number of countries 
around the world, incumbents became major players in the new mobile markets, 
which again contradicts the objectives of formation of a competitive marketplace. 
The slow pace of deregulation augmented by prohibition of competition in 
many markets in the initial phase, and allocation of radio resources for the 
incumbents, provided them opportunity to adopt their business to the changing 
institutional and, what was even more important for them, technological 
environment. The Internet was accompanied by a number of technologies that 
threatened the established order of telecommunications from different directions. 
New opportunities to use radio waves were opened, legacy copper lines were 
losing their value in the face of advancements of fiberoptic technology, the 
growing semiconductor industry was able to make totally obsolete the legacy 
communications equipment operated at that moment. Newcomers, once the 
industry was opened, could leverage implementation of new technologies and 
destroy positions of the incumbents. 8  
                                                          
7 The consolidation decision was also adopted, for example, in Portugal, where 
previously the industry had a fragmented structure (see, e.g., Jordana, Levi-Faur 
and Puig 2006). 
8 See, e,g, the analysis of the regulatory impact on disruptive innovations in the 
wireless industry in Trubnikov (2017a). 
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The “public interest” in the European reform assumed formation of the 
“Common Market”, or what later has been transformed to the “Single Digital 
Market”, and that, basically, signifies the same players in all regions of the EU. 
Taking into account the incorporated belief about natural monopoly 
characteristics of telecommunications and the claims that the single European 
market will allow to benefit from economies of scale, that, according to some 
commentators of the reform, was not possible within the borders of one country 
(see, e.g., Koenig, Bartosch and Braun 2002), it is easy to conclude that the real 
purpose was to form the pan-European oligopoly with few beneficiaries among 
the most powerful actors of the industry. Only deregulation and liberalization 
were able to open international markets and allow the most influential global 
players to extend their operations in the new territories (Clifton, Díaz-Fuentes, 
and Revuelta 2010). Paradoxically, the development of the networks 
infrastructure in the west of Europe, at the same time, has been lagging behind 
many eastern European territories (see, e.g., FTTH Council Europe 2016), which 
according to the concept of economies of scale could not benefit from this 
phenomenon so much. 
It is very important to underline that the period of formation of an industry 
is the most precious time for the rivalry fostering. This is the period of uncertainty, 
of entrepreneurial risks, of trials and errors that characterize the market process. 
This is also the period of empty fields and unsatisfied demand that open 
opportunities and create incentives for newcomers and discipline the leaders if 
they feel threats for their positions. In modern telecommunications, this period 
occurred in the 1990s-2000s and in many territories around the world, including 
European countries, the chance to create a real competitive market that could play 
for broad public interests and that could function without government support and 
regulation was missed due to the chosen policy of liberalization and deregulation. 
This choice has eventually resulted in the highly-concentrated area where the 
former monopolists have preserved their positions and their control over industry 
development, and where the most powerful of them have extended their business 
empires into new territories, forming the global oligopolistic marketplace. 
The alternative to the formation of such an oligopolistic field was de-
concentration of the industry, elimination of any economic power in the field, 
promotion of real rivalry between a large number of market participants and total 
exclusion of the government from the market performance. Laffont and Tirole 
(2000, p. 8) noticed that “many experts argue that regulation should end once local 
competition has developed and that regulation should be replaced by standard 
competition policy,” but the easiest way of formation of local competition was 
break-up of local monopolies. If competition was a target of the reform, then what 
could be a reason from the public interest perspective to wait for this development 
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of rivalry, when the competitive marketplace could be formed at once? The period 
when these monopolies were in the hands of the states was the best time for the 
formation of the competitive order, when de-concentration could have happened 
without raising the question about government intervention in market mechanisms 
and collision with arguments about private property. In this connection, Stiglitz 
(1999, p. 15), for example, noticed that “wherever possible [privatization in 
telecommunications] should preceded by the introduction of great competition, 
possibly through the extension of licenses to new private companies or by splitting 
up the telecommunications company.” 
The answer to the question is pretty obvious from the public choice view. 
The real competitive order could never have been among the purposes of the 
policymakers, just because the groups and individuals that could benefit from the 
order are not organized and, thus, could not affect the policy. The power of the 
national telecommunications giants and those groups that stayed behind the 
companies allowed them to envisage the new “competitive market” as a 
marketplace for big corporations in the form of “managed competition” (Lehman 
and Weisman 2000). The mainstream theories with claims about social benefits 
from economies of scale, problems of bottlenecks and sunk costs, the necessity of 
efficiency, welfare maximization and so forth, have been useful tools to support 
the chosen methods of the reform. 
The reasons to adopt the alternative based on the de-concentration and 
break up of large corporations were, at least, not worse than the reasons to 
embrace the approach aimed to the concentration of economic power at the global 
scale. There is no sound ground to believe that the global oligopolies are better 
suitable for the purposes of fostering innovations, stimulating investments and 
development of new services, promoting creation of advanced 
telecommunications infrastructure, while the alternative would be a solution for 
the competitive market order and for equalization of opportunities for 
entrepreneurs in the initial stages of the new economy. There was a chance not 
only to open the industry at once for competition, but also to destroy any links 
between industry players and regulatory authorities, while the role of the 
authorities in this case would be significantly reduced. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The liberalization reforms, that took place at the end of the last century, 
has been started on the international level and exploited the idea of free trade, but 
not the aim of de-concentration of economic power. The former concept has been 
a lucrative endeavor for powerful international groups or for those who was 
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seeking to extend their economic and political power in new territories, while the 
real competitive order has always required efforts in both directions. The chance 
to change the landscape of the industry and to transform this former monopolistic 
field into a competitive ground for the new economy has been missed, and the 
current trend towards a global oligopolistic marketplace yields an unprecedented 
amount of economic power to narrow groups at the global scale. 
The presented analysis allows to argue that in those spheres where 
explanations of public interest theory are not so robust and clear, the more 
plausible answers might be found in public choice. The recent surge of 
“liberalization” speaks rather in favor of the hypothesis of vested private interests 
in the policy and that they have always been greatly covered by the sauce of public 
interest justifications. “Liberalization”, “deregulation” or “demonopolization” of 
the industry have never actually signified the literal meaning of these words and 
have been used in order to legitimately transform public property into private 
hands and to extend the boarders of business empires of the most powerful actors 
of the global telecommunications market. Of course, it has provided some public 
benefits, but such benefits in line with the statement of Milton Friedman (2009) 
that “private monopoly” is “the least of the evils” in comparison with “public 
monopoly”. The results of the reform indeed introduced the market mechanisms 
in the industry, but the real free and open market has never been formed, and it is 
possible to assert that it has never been among the real objectives of the public 
policy. 
The very important conclusion from the analysis above is that the private 
interests of the most powerful groups have always had immense support from 
economic theories. The case of telecommunications shows that ideas and 
understanding of economic phenomena played an important role in adoption of 
regulatory regimes, and it is apparent that people on the top of the social pyramid 
have opportunities to pick up and foster those ideas that better fit their private 
needs. Even promotion of competition might lead to an anti-competitive outcome 
when the state tries to achieve this goal through regulation of the market process 
in accordance with prevailing theories of contemporary economics. The 
alternative approach, that in different forms might be found in contemporary pro-
market non-orthodox theories, is to regulate a form but not a process. According 
to this outlook economics should not focus on the task of optimal resources 
allocation, but on the market process and institutions that facilitate this process 
(see, e.g., Buchanan 1964). If the concentrated form is unable to provide expected 
results, we have to give a chance for competition; and, moreover, there are 
obvious reasons to anticipate that a de-concentrated form of the industry will 
positively affect the landscape of related industries and create opportunities for 
innovation activity in different fields at the same time. 
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